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Abstract 
Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory 
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory 
authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their 
long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of 
the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and 
calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to 
the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and 
welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination 
charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our 
results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer 
surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this 
decision. 
JEL classification: D43, L13, L51, L96. 
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Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs) are the charges that mobile firms levy on fixed 
networks and other mobile operators for completing, or “terminating”, calls on their 
networks (Hoernig and Harbord, 2014). At the current stage of technological 
development, mobile call termination constitutes a bottleneck service, in the sense that 
calls to a particular subscriber can only be terminated by the network operator to which 
he/she is connected. This limitation creates a monopoly situation that may distort 
competition, as mobile operators can charge very high prices for delivering calls to their 
own subscribers. In fact, as observed by Armstrong and Wright (2009a), in the absence 
of regulation, mobile operators will charge monopoly-level prices for terminating calls, 
regardless of how fierce the competition among them is to attract new customers. This 
concern was further reinforced by Gans and King (2001), who showed that, if left 
unregulated, mobile termination rates may even exceed monopoly level due to a 
negative pricing externality created by consumer ignorance about prices. 
Worries about the potential welfare-reducing effects of this excessive pricing, 
exacerbated by a history of high termination rates, led all regulatory authorities in the 
EU - and numerous others around the world - to introduce price controls. Despite this 
apparent consensus in policy decisions, the debate about the merits and demerits of 
regulation, as well as the most efficient approach to regulation, is far from being over. 
On the one hand, we have authors who believe that regulation is not the suitable 
mechanism to correct the existing market failure. Hausman (2002), for instance, argues 
that to the extent that a problem of high termination rates exists, it is because customers 
are ignorant of the charges they pay for terminating a call, and that consumer 





solution. Moreover, according to him, MTRs that exceed marginal cost (or its proxy, 
long run incremental cost) are consistent with Ramsey (quasi-efficient) pricing. 
Crandall and Sidak (2004) also support this perspective, claiming that it would be 
unrealistic and unfeasible for regulators to attempt to set MTRs at marginal cost, given 
that mobile networks must use some source of revenue to defray the very large fixed 
costs of building and operating mobile telecommunications networks and of acquiring 
new customers. This view is largely contested by a growing body of recent literature, 
which claims that the two-sided nature of mobile interconnection markets and the 
existence of significant call externalities (i.e. receiver benefits) fundamentally changes 
the competitive interaction in these markets, namely, the analysis of interconnection 
charges, as observed by Hermalin and Katz (2011). The key economic issue is no longer 
how to set prices in order to fully recover the network’s costs, but rather how to ensure 
that the prices set efficiently internalize the existing two-sided benefits. According to 
many authors, like DeGraba (2003) and Hermalin and Katz (2011), this implies welfare-
maximizing MTRs less than the marginal cost, and often less than zero.  
Another argument frequently used against regulation to cost lies on the belief that 
reducing MTRs will lower consumer surplus and perhaps even welfare in the mobile 
market. According to the proponents of this hypothesis, high MTRs are desirable, as 
they benefit mobile consumers in two distinct ways.  
On the one hand, high mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination rates reinforce mobile 
network’s incentives to set high on-net/off-net price differentials (i.e. large differences 
between the prices for calls made on the subscriber’s own network versus calls made to 
rival networks) in an attempt to reduce the number of calls that subscribers on rival 





effects, known as “tariff mediated network effects”, cause firms to compete more 
intensively for subscribers by lowering subscription fees, which benefits mobile 
consumers (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b). Thus, they claim, higher MTM lead to 
higher consumer surplus on the mobile market. 
On the other hand, high fixed-to-mobile (FTM) termination rates are a means of 
transferring surplus from fixed network callers to mobile network callers, as the high 
profits they create for mobile operators are at least partially competed away in the 
mobile market (for instance, through larger handset subsidies, reduced fees or increased 
advertising), given that mobile operators will then fight more fiercely to attract 
customers. This effect, known as “the waterbed effect”, is also believed to increase the 
number of mobile subscribers and enhancing the value of the fixed networks to their 
subscribers who are now able to reach more people.  
Despite the broad diffusion of these arguments, many voices have brought attention 
to the fact that they are actually subject to a significant number of limitations and do not 
survive some realistic extensions. First, as observed by Hoernig (2014), the claim that 
high MTM termination rates increase consumer surplus in the mobile market is only 
necessarily true in models with at most two networks. In larger settings, even though 
reducing these rates does indeed weaken the tariff mediated network effects mentioned 
above, the resulting relaxation in competition does not necessarily reduces consumer 
surplus, and it is less likely to do so the larger the call externalities. This result emerges 
from the fact that, when receiver benefits matter, network effects simultaneously benefit 
consumers via lower subscription fees (as firms compete harder for market share), and 
harm them due to higher off-net call prices (the “call externality effect”). As the number 





decreases, which, on the one hand, weakens the effect of price discrimination on the 
calling patterns of consumers, thus reducing the beneficial tariff-mediated network 
effects; and, on the other hand, exacerbates the harmful call externality effect. As 
noticed by Hoernig, this implies that “as the number of firms increases, higher MTRs 
will tend to lead to lower, instead of higher, consumer surplus”. Additionally, as 
discussed in Berger (2005) and Hoernig (2007), network based price discrimination not 
only reduces allocative efficiency and static welfare in mobile markets but also creates a 
barrier to entry and growth for smaller networks. 
When it comes to the FTM termination rates, many authors believe that the argument 
used is incomplete in two important respects. First, as before, when receiver benefits are 
significant, the argument loses much of its strength. In fact, as the level of MTRs 
increases, the welfare in the mobile market decreases. Second, as noted by Armstrong 
and Wright (2009a), high FTM create an allocative inefficiency. This implies that, even 
if all fixed-line customers also have a mobile phone, the welfare gain in the mobile 
market due to lower subscription charges is always outweighed by the welfare loss in 
the fixed market due to higher FTM termination rates. Regarding the claim that the 
waterbed effect increases the number of mobile phone subscribers thus increasing the 
value of the fixed network to its customers, it is subject to much dispute. Even though, 
historically, we have tended to assume that an increase in penetration represents an 
increase in social welfare thanks to network externalities, nowadays, when penetration 
rates exceed 100% in most countries, this association is debatable. On top of this, the 
empirical evidence of the waterbed effect is also quite ambiguous (see Genakos and 
Valletti, 2010 and Growitsch, Marcus and Wernick, 2010). 





the real effect of a reduction in MTRs on mobile market welfare and consumer surplus. 
Theoretically the impact is ambiguous and is likely to depend on the specific market 
structure, as well as on the strength of the call externalities. 
In May 2009, the European Commission (EC) issued a Recommendation that set 
clear guidelines for the regulatory treatment of MTRs in the EU, proposing dramatic 
reductions to these charges, which should no longer be based on fully allocated costs, 
but rather reflect solely the actual incremental cost of providing a call (“pure LRIC”). 
All regulatory authorities are obliged to take the utmost account of this 
Recommendation and in fact, in Portugal, ANACOM developed a costing model that 
determined the long run incremental cost of terminating a call (1.27c€ per minute). 
Despite its prompt implementation, no quantitative assessment of the welfare 
consequences of this decision was performed, and many authors still believe that other 
alternatives could have produced better results. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is 
precisely to provide a framework that allows a serious evaluation of the potential impact 
of several different approaches to regulating MTRs, namely:  
1) Pure LRIC, as recommended by the EC and implemented by ANACOM; 
2) Reciprocity with fixed market, i.e. setting MTRs at the same level as FTRs; 
3) Bill and Keep, i.e. setting MTRs equal to zero. 
Despite the growing theoretical evidence against it and the explicit prohibition by the 
EC, we also estimated the effect of asymmetric MTRs, i.e. allowing the smaller network 
to charger higher termination prices than its rivals. 
Based on Hoernig and Harbord (2014) model of the UK mobile market, we 
simulated the impact on total welfare, consumer surplus and profits, in the Portuguese 





The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Portuguese 
telecommunications market. Section 3 introduces the EC Recommendation and Section 
4 presents the evolution of MTRs in Portugal. Section 5 describes the market model, 
while Section 6 details the calibration procedure and data used. Section 7 reports the 
simulation results and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. THE PORTUGUESE MARKET 
At the end of 2012, there were 20 entities legally authorized to provide fixed 
telephony service in Portugal, although only 15 were effectively active. The incumbent 
operator and market leader is Grupo PT, even though its market share has been 
declining in the previous years. The penetration rate reaches 43.2 accesses per 100 
inhabitants, below the European average (44.1), but, contrary to the latter, exhibiting a 
tendency of growth mainly due to the proliferation of new offers (e.g. multiple play).  
Regarding the mobile telephony service, it was first offered in Portugal in 1989 by a 
Consortium consisting of CTT – Correios de Portugal and TLF – Telefones de Lisboa e 
Porto. Two years later, this Consortium gave place to TMN, the first mobile operator in 
Portugal and still the market leader. Nowadays, there are three mobile operators in the 
market (TMN, Vodafone and Optimus), whose asymmetry in market shares is largely 
explained by the different times of entry. Penetration rate reaches 159.3 active cards per 
100 inhabitants, well above the EU average, and it was estimated that 92.8% of the 
people living in Portugal were clients of the mobile telephone service.  
 
Importance of the sector in the Portuguese economy 
In 2012, in Portugal, the total value of the electronic communications market was 





EU-27 average, the weight of this sector is one percentage point higher in Portugal.  The 
overall investment in electronic communications added up to € 1,104M, an amount that 
represented 4.01% of the total Portuguese gross formation of fixed capital. In terms of 
employment, this market alone was responsible for more than 14,000 jobs. 
 
3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 
MTRs are regulated in all European Member States. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant asymmetry on the regulatory approach followed by national authorities and a 
wide divergence of these rates across countries that cannot be solely justified by 
differences in the underlying costs or other national characteristics. For instance, in 
2008, MTRs ranged from 2 c€ per minute in Cyprus to 15 c€ per minute in Bulgaria, 
being on average 8.55 c€ per minute. Despite the downward trend that has been 
observed in recent years, they were still around 10 times higher than FTRs (on average 
ranging from 0.57c€ to 1.13 c€ per minute).  
Moreover, the traditional approach to regulation has been to allow for total cost 
recovery, based on fully allocated cost models. Recent literature has drawn attention to 
the fact that this strategy may not be suitable given the two-sided nature of the mobile 
interconnection markets and the existence of call externalities. Harbord and Pagnozzi 
(2010) even claim that this approach, by exacerbating network incentives to engage in 
the inefficient network based price discrimination, creates a distortion in prices and loss 
in welfare as serious as the initial distortion that regulation aimed at repairing (i.e. the 
subsidy of mobile subscription via high termination charges).  
Incorporating much of this new economic thinking, in May 2009, the EC issued a 
Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates 





particular, it establishes that MTRs at the national level should be based only on the real 
costs that an operator, using the most efficient technology available, incurs to establish 
the connection, and should apply to all operators at the same level. By creating a 
common regulatory framework, this Recommendation aims at removing the existing 
price distortions between phone operators across the EU, which is expected to lower 
consumer prices within and between Member States, boost sustainable competition in 
the Single Market and help investment and innovation in the entire telecommunication 
sector. A Commission Staff Working Paper that accompanied the Recommendation 
predicts a potential reduction in mobile industry profits of around € 4 billion over the 
three initial years, more than off-set by the additional revenues for fixed operators and 
additional consumer benefits.  
 
4. Mobile Termination Rates in Portugal 
In Portugal, FTM termination prices are regulated since 2000, while MTM 
termination rates are subject to price controls since 2002. The initial regulated prices 
were revised in 2005, when a market analysis led ANACOM to determine that the 
existing mobile operators had significant market power and to establish a glide-path (i.e. 
a gradual reduction of prices) to bring Portuguese MTRs closer to the European 
benchmark. Due to its later entry in the market, OPTIMUS was allowed to charge 
higher prices than its competitors for a while, but at the end of this glide-path (initially 
at October 2006, later postponed to October 2008) there should be symmetry among the 
different operators and the different types of interconnection.  
In 2010, after the approval of the EC’s Recommendation, ANACOM granted 
Analysys Mason Limited Consultant the development and implementation of a costing 





incremental costs of an efficient operator. Based on these results, the new maximum 
price allowed for mobile termination was set at 1.27 c€, which should be reached by the 
end of 2012, trough quarterly reductions of 0.5 c€. 
 
 
5. A MODEL OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
Our model of the Portuguese telecommunications market is an extension of the 
Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model for the UK1, assuming, as in Calzada and Valletti 
(2008), logit subscription demand. In our model, contrary to one monopolist fixed 
operator, we allow for many asymmetric networks. 
 
Model Setup: 
Networks: We assume 𝑚 = 3 asymmetric mobile networks and 𝑛 = 4 fixed networks 
of different sizes. We consider imperfect competition in both markets, with no strategic 
competition between them but with strategic competition within them. In other words, 
consumers perceive fixed and mobile telephony services as non-substitutable, but 
mobile (fixed) networks as substitutable and horizontally differentiated. All networks 
are assumed to be interconnected with each other. We focus exclusively on voice calls, 
excluding other services provided by operators (e.g. text messages). 
 
Market Shares: Subscriber market shares are denoted by 𝛼! > 0, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚  with 
𝛼!!!!! = 1 for each mobile network 𝑖, and by 𝜃! > 0, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑛 with 𝜃!!!!! = 1 
for each fixed network 𝑘 . Given our assumption of logit subscription demand, 













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






where 𝜎, 𝛾 > 0 measure the degree of product differentiation (higher values imply less 
differentiation), 𝐴! and 𝐵! are specific connection surplus, and 𝑤!!and 𝑤!! are specific 
call surplus. In simplified matrix notation, the vectors of mobile market shares 
𝛼 = 𝛼! !×! and fixed market shares 𝜃 = 𝜃! !×!  can be written, respectively, as:  
𝛼 = 𝑔! 𝜎(𝐴 + 𝑤!)  and 𝜃 = 𝑔!(𝛾 𝐵 + 𝑤! ), 
where 𝐴 = 𝐴! !×!, 𝐵 = 𝐵! !×!, 𝑤! = 𝑤!! !×!, 𝑤! = 𝑤!! !×!, and the functions 
𝑔!:  ℝ! → 0,1 !  and 𝑔!:  ℝ! → 0,1 !  are assumed to be differentiable with 
symmetric Jacobian 𝐺, all of which is consistent with the logit model assumption. 
 
Costs: Similar cost structures are assumed for both mobile and fixed networks. Each 
additional customer implies a given fixed cost, and each call minute terminated or 
originated by the network implies a constant marginal cost. Moreover, networks charge 
a price equal to their termination rate for terminating incoming calls. 
Thus, mobile network 𝑖 faces a fixed yearly cost of 𝑓! per subscriber; on-net per 
minute cost of 𝑐!!! = 𝑐!"! + 𝑐!"!, where the indices 𝑜 and 𝑡 correspond to origination and 
termination, respectively; off-net per minute cost of 𝑐!"! = 𝑐!"! +𝑀𝑇𝑅! and fixed per 
minute cost of 𝑐!"!" = 𝑐!"! + 𝐹𝑇𝑅!, where 𝑀𝑇𝑅 and 𝐹𝑇𝑅 stand for the network specific 
mobile and fixed termination rate, respectively. 
Similarly, fixed network 𝑘 incurs a fixed yearly fee of  𝑑! per customer; on-net per 
minute cost of 𝑐!!! = 𝑐!"! + 𝑐!"! ; off-net per minute cost of 𝑐!"! = 𝑐!"! + 𝐹𝑇𝑅! and fixed-
to-mobile per minute cost of  𝑐!"!" = 𝑐!"! +𝑀𝑇𝑅!. 
 
Tariffs: We assume that both mobile and fixed networks use two-part tariffs and apply 
uniform off-net prices, i.e., they charge the same price for calls to different networks. 





and minute prices of 𝑝!!! for on-net calls, 𝑝!"! for off-net calls, where 𝑝!"! = 𝑝!"!   ∀  𝑗, 𝑏 ≠ 𝑖 
(uniform price), and 𝑝!"!" for calls to the fixed networks, where again 𝑝!"!" = 𝑝!"!"   ∀  𝑘, 𝑧. 
The tariffs of the fixed market are determined in a similar way. Besides the annual 
subscription fee, 𝐷!, each fixed network 𝑘 charges its customers a per-minute price of 
𝑝!!!  for calls on its own network; 𝑝!"!  for calls to other fixed networks; and 𝑝!"!" for calls 
to any mobile network. As before, fixed networks are assumed to use uniform prices. 
 
Consumer Surplus: The number of consumers in the mobile market (𝑀), as well as in 
the fixed market (𝑁), are assumed to be constant. We assume subscribers' utility depend 
on the given network they are connected to, and on the amount and duration of calls 
made and received. As the utility depends on incoming calls, a call externality is 
assumed to exist. Specifically, subscribers in the mobile market 𝑖 [fixed market 𝑘] 
receive a fixed utility of 𝐴! [𝐵!]; a utility for making calls of 𝑢! 𝑞   [𝑢! 𝑞 ], where 𝑞 is 
the call length in minutes; and a utility from receiving calls of 𝛽!𝑢! 𝑞  [𝛽!𝑢! 𝑞 ], 
where 0 ≤ 𝛽! ,𝛽! ≤ 1 measure the strength of the call externality.  
We assume, moreover, that all subscribers on the fixed and mobile networks are 
called with equal probability, therefore, if the same price applied to all consumers in the 
market, we would have a balanced calling pattern. In other words, each network would 
generate as many off-net calls as it would receive as incoming calls from each of the 
other networks. In the presence of price differentials, however, the demand for calls is a 
function of the per-minute price. For a given 𝑝, consumer demand calls of length 𝑞 𝑝 , 
which implies a surplus from making calls of 𝑣 𝑝 = 𝑢 𝑞 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑞 𝑝 , with 
𝑞 𝑝 = −𝑣! 𝑝 . By adding the utility from receiving calls and subtracting the 





For a single subscriber of mobile network 𝑖, this can be written as: 











where ℎ!"! = 𝑣!"! + 𝛽!𝑢!"! and ℎ!"!" = 𝑣!"!" + 𝛽!𝑢!"!". 
In matrix notation, this is equivalent to: 𝑤! = 𝑀ℎ!𝛼 + 𝑁ℎ!"𝜃 − 𝐹,  
where  ℎ! = ℎ!"! !×!, ℎ
!" = ℎ!"!" !×! and 𝐹 = 𝐹! !×!. 
Similarly, a subscriber of fixed network k obtains the following surplus: 











where ℎ!"! = 𝑣!"! + 𝛽!𝑢!"!  and ℎ!"!" = 𝑣!"!" + 𝛽!𝑢!"!". 
With matrix representation given by: 𝑤! = 𝑁ℎ!𝜃 +𝑀ℎ!"𝛼 − 𝐷. 
Recalling our logit subscription demand assumption, it implies that the aggregate 












Profits: Profits for both mobile and fixed networks are a function of subscription fees, 
originated and terminated calls. Specifically, mobile network i's profit can be written as: 
𝜋!! = 𝑀𝛼! 𝑀 𝛼!𝑅!"!!!!! + 𝑁 𝜃!𝑅!"!" + 𝐹! − 𝑓!!!!! , 
where 𝑅!!  is the proft from on-net calls and equals 𝑅!!! = 𝑝!!! − 𝑐!!! 𝑞!!! ; 𝑅!"! =
𝑝!"! − 𝑐!"! 𝑞!"! + 𝑀𝑇𝑅! − 𝑐!"! 𝑞!"!  is the profit from off-net calls; and 𝑅!"!" =
𝑝!"!" − 𝑐!"!" 𝑞!"!" + 𝑀𝑇𝑅! − 𝑐!"! 𝑞!"!" is the profit from mobile-to-fixed calls. 
The same applies to the fixed market. Therefore, network k's profit is equal to:  





In aggregate, the joint profit in mobile market is Π! = 𝑀𝛼! 𝑀𝑅!𝛼 + 𝑁𝑅!"𝜃 + 𝐹 −
𝑓  and in the fixed market is Π! = 𝑁𝜃! 𝑁𝑅!𝜃 +𝑀𝑅!"𝛼 + 𝐷 − 𝑑 . 
 
Welfare: All of the above implies a total welfare of:  𝑊 = 𝑆! + 𝑆! + Π! + Π!. 
 
Equilibrium Outcomes 
We used the standard Nash equilibrium concept to determine the equilibrium call prices 
and subscription fees in both mobile and fixed markets. Computations can be found in 
Appendix 1. 









, 𝑝!"!" = 𝑐!"!", while 









, 𝑝!"!" = 𝑐!"!". 
Equilibrium fixed fees, for mobile and fixed firms are, respectively: 
𝐹! = 𝑓! − 𝑁 𝜃!𝑅!"!" +𝑀 𝛼! 𝑅!"! − 𝑅!"!!!!!!!!! , 









!×𝑅!"!!!!! , 𝑅!"! = 0  ∀  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, 𝐻!"! = −
𝑑𝛼! 𝑑𝐹!








! ×𝑅!"!!!!! , 𝑅!"! = 0  ∀  𝑙 ≠ 𝑘, 𝐻!"! = −
𝑑𝜃! 𝑑𝐷! 𝛾, 𝑙, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑛. 
In matrix notation, fixed fees can be rewritten as 𝐹 = 𝑓 − 𝑁𝑅!"𝜃 +𝑀 𝑅! − 𝑅! 𝛼 
and 𝐷 = 𝑑 −𝑀𝑅!"𝛼 + 𝑁 𝑅! − 𝑅! 𝜃. 
After substitution, we are able to obtain the equilibrium market shares given by: 
𝛼 = 𝑔! 𝜎 𝐴 − 𝑓 +𝑀 ℎ! + 𝑅! − 𝑅! 𝛼 + 𝑁 ℎ!" + 𝑅!" 𝜃 , 
𝜃 = 𝑔! 𝛾 𝐵 − 𝑑 + 𝑁 ℎ! + 𝑅! − 𝑅! 𝜃 +𝑀 ℎ!" + 𝑅!" 𝛼 . 





Π! = 𝑀!𝛼!𝑅!𝛼 and Π! = 𝑁!𝜃!𝑅!𝜃. 
The condition for the equilibrium market shares can be solved numerically, allowing us 
to compute all the remaining variables. 
 
6. CALIBRATION AND DATA 
After having derived the theoretical equilibrium outcomes, we have calibrated the 
key parameters of the model using data from the Portuguese telecommunication market 
directly provided by ANACOM or from its “Relatório do Sector das Comunicações 
2012”.  We have collected information about subscriber market shares, number of 
subscribers, minutes of traffic and total revenues. In the absence of data for networks 
marginal costs, we have assumed that 1) termination costs for mobile operators equal 
the endpoint of the latest glide-path set by ANACOM (after the costing model has been 
developed), 2) there is symmetry between origination and termination costs, 3) fixed 
costs are zero. We assumed, moreover, symmetric costs among operators. Regarding the 
fixed market, we were only able to obtain information for the historical operator, which 
forced us to assume that the alternative networks have similar cost structures. As before, 
for simplicity, no fixed costs were considered. 
The first step of the calibration procedure was to compute the call demand 
parameters. We assumed linear call demands, q(p) = a – bp, and used exogenous values 
for the call demand elasticity ε and the call externality β. Based on recent literature, we 
believe ε=-0,5 is a reasonable assumption and the results reported below are for that 
specific case. Nevertheless, we have run the calibrations and simulations for a range of 
different values and the results were qualitatively similar. Regarding the call 





i.e., from β!=0 (no call externalities) to β!=1 (the receiving party has the same utility 
has the calling party). Then, using the parameters computed, we determined the 
horizontal differentiation parameters σ and γ, for the mobile and fixed markets 
respectively. Finally, the preference asymmetry parameters, A for the mobile market 
and B for the fixed market, were derived. 
 
Data: 
Costs: In the absence of data for networks marginal costs, we assumed a marginal cost 
of originating and terminating calls on mobile networks of 1.27 c€ per minute, 
corresponding to ANACOM’s estimate of pure LRIC. Similarly, for the fixed market, 
we assumed that the marginal origination and termination costs are symmetric and equal 
ANACOM’s latest regulatory proposal to the EC of 0.1114 c€ per minute. For the 
calibration, we used the 2010 mobile termination charges of 6 c€ per minute and fixed 
terminate charges of 0.285c€2 per minute. 
 
Subscribers and market shares:  In 2010, the total number of mobile subscribers was 
13.083 million and of fixed subscribers was 3.746 million. The subscriber market shares 
for each mobile and fixed network are presented in Table 1.	  
 
Mobile Market Fixed Market 
TMN 44.2% Grupo PT 59.3% 
Vodafone 39.7% ZON 14.8% 
Optimus 16.1% Optimus 12.9% 
  Other operators 13% 
Table 1. Market shares for mobile and fixed networks. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Traffic: In 2010, MTM voice traffic was 18,416 million of minutes (M min), much 
higher than the FTF traffic of 6,411 M min. Mobile subscribers’ calls to fixed 
subscribers amounted to 670 M min, while the fixed-to-mobile traffic was 891 M min. 
 
Revenues: Total revenue from voice communications and monthly rental fees 
amounted, in 2010, to € 1,696 M in the mobile market and € 675 M in the fixed market. 
 
Calibration: 
Demand Parameters: Using the theoretical equilibrium outcome derived above, along 
with data for marginal costs and market shares, we were able to compute predicted call 
prices, for each value of the call externality β!. Then, given our assumption about call 
demand elasticity, ε = -0,5, as well as the model’s predictions of the relative proportions 
of on-net and off-net calls, we were able to match the equilibrium tariffs with the 
observed demand to recover the linear demand parameters a and b. For instance, for 
MTM calls, we matched the model predicted MTM call minutes (a function of predicted 
prices and endogenously determined market shares) with the observed demand of 
𝑄!=18,416 M min from a mass of subscribers of 𝑚=13,083 million, such that: 
𝑄 = 𝑚! 𝛼!𝛼! 𝑎! − 𝑏!𝑝!"! = 𝑚!(!!,!!! 𝑎! − 𝑏!𝑝!), 
where 𝑝! = 𝛼!𝛼!𝑝!"!!!,!  is the average price. 












Thus, for MTM calls, we obtained am = 161.39, as well as the following values of the 





 𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0,25 𝛽!=0,5 𝛽!=0,75 𝛽!=1 
bm  9.82  8.79  7.38  5.63  3.49 
Table 2. Demand slope for mobile-to-mobile calls. 
A similar calibration exercise resulted in amf = 20.51 and bmf =4.40, for MTF calls, and 
afm = 27.30 and bfm = 1.49, for FTM calls. 
 
Horizontal Differentiation Parameter: After having calibrated the demand parameters, 
we were able to determine, for each value of the call externality 𝛽!, the differentiation 
parameters of the logit subscription demand (σ for the mobile market and γ for the fixed 
market), by matching the model’s predicted revenues from fixed subscription and voice 
calls with the observed ones, knowing that total revenue for the mobile and fixed market 
is given, respectively, by: 


















The calibrated values, which were always within the stable range3, i.e. σ < σstab and γ < 
γstab , are reported below. 
 𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
σ 0.0138846 0.0121220 0.0099879 0.0073838 0.0040738 
σstab 0.0340904 0.0212334 0.0136370 0.0083051 0.0041324 
γ 0.0113446 0.0113446 0.0113446 0.0113446 0.0113446 
γstab 0.1485701 0.1485701 0.1485701 0.1485701 0.1485701 
Table 3. Differentiation parameters 
Asymmetry Parameters: Finally, we were able to determine the network asymmetry 
parameters from observed market shares, predicted equilibrium prices and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This stability check is essentially a consistency check that allows us to exclude multiple equilibria and 
tipping, without further implications given that is has been verified.  γstab  and σstab were determined as 






previously calibrated differentiation parameters. Given our assumption of logit 
subscription demand, only pairwise differences, i.e. Ai – Aj for the mobile market and 
Bk - Bl for the fixed market, can be calibrated. We have, therefore, normalize Ai = 0 for 
TMN and Bk = 0 for PT, which implies that the remaining asymmetry parameters 
identified and reported below represent the additional amount a subscriber would be 
willing to pay to change from TMN or PT to each of the alternative networks, if 
everything else was otherwise identical. 
























 𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
Vodafone -15 -16 -17 -19 -18 
Optimus -95 -92 -87 -82 -215 
Fixed Market 
ZON -224 -224 -224 -224 -224 
Optimus -238 -238 -238 -238 -238 
Other operators -237 -237 -237 -237 -237 
Table 4. Asymmetry parameters (€ per year) 
The counter intuitive non-monotonic behavior of the asymmetry parameter of 
Optimus is explained by network effects. As the strength of the call externality 
increases - in particular, when 𝛽!   > 0.8 -, mobile networks significantly enlarge their 
on-net/off-net price differentials. For a fixed demand function, this increase would lead 
to a dramatic reduction of the quantity of calls demanded. However, as in the calibration 
procedure we are assuming this quantity is fixed, the adjustment has to be achieved 
through the slope of the demand function, as seen in Table 2. Thus, even with the higher 
off-net prices, the demand of the smaller operator increases. As a result, the consumer 





Nevertheless, as in the calibration these are also assumed to be constant, the adjustment 
is achieved through the specific connection surplus, A, which significantly reduces. 
 
7. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We simulated the impact of reducing MTRs in consumer surplus, profits and welfare. 
We tested four different scenarios, and assumed values for the call externality parameter 
𝛽!of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. All results are reported in € million and refer to changes 
compared to the baseline scenario, which was assumed to be MTRs at the 2010 level 
(6c€ per minute for all mobile operators). Positive values represent increases in the 
variables under consideration, while negative values imply a reduction. Market shares, 
which are determined endogenously in our model, are not reported here as they do not 
change significantly compared to their 2010 level, but they can be found in Appendix 2. 
Pure LRIC, Reciprocity with fixed market and Bill and Keep 
Mobile Market: Considering the mobile market in isolation, our simulations produced 
the following results. 
Change in Mobile Market Welfare 
 
𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
Pure LRIC 65 199 428 896 2148 
Reciprocal with Fixed 45 190 433 919 2204 
Bill and Keep 38 184 430 919 2211 
Asymmetric rates 16 130 330 761 1947 
Change in Mobile Market Consumer Surplus 
Pure LRIC -181 -193 -241 -389 -1268 
Reciprocal with Fixed -242 -257 -308 -461 -1378 
Bill and Keep -261 -277 -330 -485 -1412 
Asymmetric rates -65 -89 -151 -307 -1094 
Change in Mobile Market Profits 
Pure LRIC 246 392 669 1285 3416 
Reciprocal with Fixed 287 447 741 1380 3582 
Bill and Keep 299 461 760 1405 3623 
Asymmetric rates 80 219 481 1068 3041 





As shown in Table 5, reducing MTRs to any of the three typical alternatives 
described before has a clear positive effect in welfare in the mobile market for all values 
of 𝛽!. This increase ranges from €38 million to € 2 billion per year, depending on the 
strength of the call externality. Nevertheless, contrary to the results of Harbord and 
Hoernig (2014) for the UK, this increase is exclusively driven by a rise in profits, given 
that consumer surplus is significantly lowered (a reduction increasing in the value of 
𝛽!). These losses for consumers are explained by the reduction in the waterbed effect 
and the weaker tariff mediated network effects. While the former reduces fixed-to-
mobile transfers, the latter relaxes competition, which harms consumers through higher 
subscription fees. These results suggest that, given the particular structure of the 
Portuguese market, the positive impact of lower off-net prices (the call externality 
effect) is outweighed by the remaining effects, regardless of the strength of the call 
externality.  In fact, contrary to the theoretical intuition, the higher the ratio of receiver 
benefits, the higher the loss for consumers. Regarding mobile networks’ profits, they 
tend to increase for all values of 𝛽! due to the network competition effect. Adopting a 
pure LRIC approach seems to bring the highest welfare gain and the less harm to 
consumers. 
Fixed Market: Considering now the fixed market, we see that, similarly to what 
happened in the mobile market, welfare increases under all the alternatives considered. 
The estimated values, as expected, do not depend on the strength of the mobile calls 
externality 𝛽!. 
Change in Fixed Market Welfare 
Pure LRIC 50 
Reciprocal with Fixed 63 
Bill and Keep 67 





Change in Fixed Market Consumer Surplus 
Pure LRIC 50 
Reciprocal with Fixed 63 
Bill and Keep 67 
Asymmetric rates 35 
Change in Fixed Market Profits 
Pure LRIC 0 
Reciprocal with Fixed 0 
Bill and Keep 0 
Asymmetric rates 0 







This increase is explained both by the reduction of transfers to mobile networks and 
by the increase in FTM quantities towards their efficient level (change from 18,201 to 
25,244 millions of minutes).  Under the assumption of competition in the fixed market, 
this gain is captured by consumers, rather than fixed networks. In fact, fixed-to-fixed 
(FTF) prices and call quantities are independent of the level of MTRs, and even though 
FTM call quantities increase, as they are priced at cost, profits remain constant. 
Contrary to the mobile case, in the fixed market it is the “Bill and Keep” approach 
that produces the highest gains.  
Aggregate Welfare: Considering aggregate welfare, i.e. the sum of welfare in the mobile 
and the fixed markets, we see that, regardless of the strength of the call externality and 
the scenario considered, welfare increases significantly. Depending on 𝛽!, this gain can 
go from € 100 million to € 2.2 billion. This impressive rise reflects the elimination of 
the distortion introduced by setting MTRs above cost, which depresses call quantities 
and inflates prices. Nevertheless, these benefits are mainly absorbed by network 
operators, as aggregate consumer surplus decreases in all the alternatives analyzed, 
suggesting a higher importance of the waterbed effect and tariff mediated network 





LRIC-based pricing results in the highest welfare gain, but when call externalities 
matter welfare-maximizing MTRs are always below cost.   
Change in Aggregate Welfare 
  𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
Pure LRIC 115 249 478 946 2198 
Reciprocal with Fixed 108 253 496 982 2267 
Bill and Keep 104 251 497 986 2278 
Asymmetric rates 51 165 364 794 1983 
Change in Aggregate Consumer Surplus 
Pure LRIC -131 -143 -190 -339 -1218 
Reciprocal with Fixed -179 -194 -245 -399 -1315 
Bill and Keep -194 -211 -263 -419 -1345 
Asymmetric rates -29 -54 -116 -274 -1058 
Change in Aggregate Profits 
Pure LRIC 246 392 669 1285 3416 
Reciprocal with Fixed 287 447 741 1380 3582 
Bill and Keep 299 461 760 1405 3623 
Asymmetric rates 80 219 481 1068 3041 
Table 7. Aggregate welfare effects	  
Asymmetric Rates: 
Challenging recent literature that opposes asymmetric rates, we simulated the impact 
of regulating TMN and Vodafone’s MTRs to cost, while allowing Optimus (the 
smallest network) to keep its 2010 level termination charge. Our results show that, in 
comparison to the pure LRIC case, social welfare increases less both in mobile and 
fixed markets. Nevertheless, this decrease is due to smaller increases in mobile 
operators’ profits, rather than consumer surplus. As detailed in Appendix 3, contrary to 
the remaining alternatives where all mobile operators’ profits increased, when 
asymmetric rates are introduced only Optimus benefits, while TMN and Vodafone are 
worse off than in the baseline scenario. Moreover, interestingly, consumers in the 
mobile market are much less harmed when asymmetric charges are introduced than with 
LRIC-oriented prices. This result can, once again, be explained by the waterbed effect, 





competed away in retail market due to the assumption of competition.  
 
Additional Issues: 
The framework developed in this paper allowed us to estimate the likely welfare 
impacts of reducing MTRs to several different scenarios, but it is, nevertheless, unable 
to capture other potential effects that may accrue from the EC’s decision.  First, we have 
assumed that changing MTRs does not alter the structure of retail prices (CPNP 
principle), while in fact empirical evidence and some recent literature suggest that 
reducing MTRs below cost may lead networks to adopt a receiving party pays regime 
(RPP), where consumers have to pay for receiving calls. Based on pure theory, it is not 
possible to make any prediction on this subject, as the literature is still scarce and the 
results ambiguous. Moreover, as noted by Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010), even when 
mobile termination rates are zero, reception charges tend to be relatively modest. The 
EC, on its turn, believes that it is highly unlikely that aligning MTRs to cost will result 
in a RPP regime. It claims that the CPNP principle is “firmly anchored in the mentality 
and consumer behavior of Europeans” and that any company trying to change it would 
probably lose much of its customers to competition. 
Another potential effect that is omitted in this model is the possibility of higher 
investments and innovations in the fixed sector once the cross-subsidy from fixed to 
mobile customers is removed. This would not only benefit consumers, who would enjoy 
wider offer of services, but also fixed operators who would have additional revenue 
sources and opportunities. Our model does not allow us to draw any conclusion on the 
likelihood of this scenario, as fixed networks’ profits remain constant by assumption. 
Finally, it is possible that reducing MTRs, by eliminating barriers to entry, increases 





stronger competition. Even though our model is not able to directly assess this 
possibility, the fact that mobile networks’ profits increased significantly may indeed 
encourage other operators to enter the market, thus confirming the theoretical 
prediction. It is, nevertheless, very hard to be sure solely based on our framework. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The 2009 EC’s Recommendation proposed a dramatic change in the regulatory 
approach to MTRs in Europe, which led to significant reductions of these charges in 
most countries, including Portugal. While there is indeed some theoretical support of 
this new policy orientation in recent literature, there are also some voices that strongly 
oppose such shift. In fact, based on pure theory, it is not possible to predict what the 
likely effects of reducing MTRs will be. 
In this paper we have developed a framework to quantitatively assess the potential 
impact of changing MTRs in Portugal. Our results show that, in line with the EC’s 
Recommendation, reducing MTRs does indeed increase social welfare, profits and 
consumer surplus in the fixed market. Nevertheless, mobile consumers will be seriously 
harmed and this loss is not outweighed by the gain of fixed subscribers. This result 
provides some evidence of the ‘waterbed effect’. Among the different regulatory 
approaches, pure LRIC results in the highest increase in overall welfare and is also the 
approach that harms consumers the least. In contrast with recent literature, asymmetric 
rates are beneficial for consumers, even though the increase in aggregate social welfare 
is smaller than with other alternatives. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  Armstrong, M. and Wright, J.. 2009a. “Mobile Call Termination.” Economic 





[2]  Berger, Ulrich. 2004. “Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities.” The 
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 3(1): 1-18. 
[3]  Crandall, Robert W. and Sidak, J. Gregory. 2004. “Should Regulators Set Rates to 
Terminate Calls on Mobile Networks?” Yale Journal on Regulation, 21(2): 261-
314. 
[4]  DeGraba, P. 2003. “Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks 
when customers share the value of a call.” Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 12: 207-230. 
[5]  European Commission. 2009a. Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory 
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, 7 May, Brussels. 
[6]  European Commission. 2009b. Explanatory Note, Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory 
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, Brussels. 
[7]  European Commission. 2009c. Implications for Industry, Competition and 
Consumers, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission 
Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination 
Rates in the EU, Brussels. 
[8]  Gans, J. and King, S.. 2001. “Using ‘bill and keep’ interconnect arrangements to 
soften network competition’. Economics Letters, 71(3): 413-420. 
[9]  Genakos, C. and Valletti, T.. 2011. “Testing the ‘waterbed’ effect in mobile 
telephony.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9: 1114-1142. 
[10]  Growitsch, Christian, Marcus, Scott and Wernick, Christian. 2010. “The effects of 
lower mobile termination rates on retail price and demand.” Paper presented at 
Euro CPR conference, Brussels, 28-30 March. 
[11]  Harbord, David and Hoernig, Steffen. 2014. “Welfare Analysis of Regulating 
Mobile Termination Rates in the UK.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 
forthcoming. 
[12]  Harbord, David and Pagnozzi, Marco. 2010. “Network-based price discrimination 
and ‘bill and keep’ vs. ‘cost-based’ regulation of mobile termination rates.” 
Review of Network Economics, 9(1), Article 1. 
[13]  Hausman, Jerry A. 2002. “Mobile Telephone”. In Handbook of 
Telecommunications Economics I, ed. Martin Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar and Ingo 
Vogelsang, 563-604. Elsevier. 
[14]  Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Katz, Michael L.. 2011. “Customer or 
Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two-Sided Benefits.” Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, 20(2): 379-408. 
[15]  Hoernig, Steffen. 2007. “On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric 
Telecommunications Networks.” Information Economics & Policy, 19(2): 171-
188. 
[16]  Hoernig, Steffen. 2014. “Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: 
Theory and applications.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
32(C): 57-69. 
[17]  Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Rey, Patrick and Tirole, Jean. 1998b. “Network 





APPENDIX 1: Equilibrium Outcomes 
 
Mobile Market: 
Given our assumption of uniform off-net call prices and inelastic subscription demand, 
we were able to determine equilibrium call prices through the standard technique of 
holding market shares constant by appropriate adjustments of the fixed fee 𝐹!, which 
will be determined afterwards. 
Thus, for on-net prices 𝑝!!!  and the mobile-to-fixed price 𝑝!"!"  mobile firm 𝑖  holds 
𝑤!! = 𝑀 𝛼!!!!! ℎ!"! + 𝑁 𝜃!ℎ!"!"!!!! − 𝐹! constant.   
Using the fact that !"
!"
= −𝑞 and !!!!
!
!!!!
! = 𝑝!!! 𝑞!!! ! and assuming that the relevant second-





!×𝑑𝑝!!! − 𝑑𝐹! ⟺
!!!
!!!!
! = 𝑀𝛼! 𝛽!𝑝!!! 𝑞!!! ! − 𝑞!!! , 
0 = 𝑁 !!!"
!"
!!!"
!"×𝑑𝑝!"!" − 𝑑𝐹! ⟺
!!!
!!!"
!" = −𝑞!"!"𝑁. 
For off-net call prices 𝑝!"!! , we have to take into account the existence of call 
externalities, which implies that any change in 𝑝!"!  not only affects 𝑤!! , but also 
𝑤!! = 𝑀 𝛼!ℎ!"!!!!! + 𝑁 𝜃!ℎ!"!"!!!! − 𝐹!, with: 
𝑑𝑤!! = −𝑀 1− 𝛼! 𝑞!"!𝑑𝑝!"! − 𝑑𝐹! , 
𝑑𝑤!! = 𝑀𝛼!𝛽!𝑝!"! 𝑞!"!
!𝑑𝑝!"!. 
Recalling our assumption of uniform off-net call prices, we have that 𝑑𝑤!! = 𝑑𝑤!! for 
all 𝑗, 𝑧 ≠ 𝑖. From 𝛼!!!!! = 𝐸!𝛼 = 1, where 𝐸 is a 𝑚×1  vector of ones, it follows 





The response of market shares to a small change in surplus 𝑑𝑤 is given by 𝑑𝛼 =
𝜎𝐺!𝑑𝑤!. Thus, in order to keep market shares constant, 𝑑𝑤! has to be proportional to 
𝐸, i.e. 𝑑𝑤!! = 𝑑𝑤!! for all 𝑗: 
!!!
!!!"
! = −𝑀 1− 𝛼! 𝑞!"! + 𝛼!𝛽!𝑝!"! 𝑞!"!
! . 
Finally, firm 𝑖’s first-order conditions on profit maximization, assuming once again that 
the relevant second order conditions hold, become: 
𝑑𝜋!!
𝑑𝑝!!!
= 𝑀!𝛼!! 𝑞!!! + 𝑝!!! − 𝑐!!! 𝑞!!! ! + 𝛽!𝑝!!! 𝑞!!! ! − 𝑞!!! = 0 
𝑑𝜋!!
𝑑𝑝!"!










= 𝑀𝑁𝛼! 𝑞!"!" + 𝑝!"!" − 𝑐!"!" 𝑞!"!" ! − 𝑞!"!" = 0 
where 𝑐!"! is the average off-net cost and equals 𝑐!"! = 𝛼!𝑐!"! 1− 𝛼!!!! . 










 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. 
 
The next step is to determine networks’ optimal subscription fees. Recalling that market 
shares are given by 𝛼 = 𝑔! 𝜎(𝐴 + 𝑤!)  and call surplus equals 𝑤! = 𝑀ℎ!𝛼 +
𝑁ℎ!"𝜃 − 𝐹, through the implicit function theorem we are able to determine the effect 
of a change in fixed fees on market shares: 
!"
!"
= −𝜎 𝐼 − 𝜎𝑀𝐺!ℎ! !!𝐺 ≡ −𝜎𝐻!         
A sufficient condition for 𝐼 − 𝜎𝑀𝐺!ℎ! !!  (and thus 𝐻) to exist is “stability in 





that 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝐼 − 𝜎𝑀𝐺!ℎ! = 0. In the following computations we assume this condition 
holds4. 
From the above, it follows that the impact of firm 𝑖’s fixed fee, 𝐹!, on firm 𝑗’s market 
share, 𝛼!, is 
!!!
!!!










+ 𝐹! − 𝑓!  
+  𝑀𝛼! 1− 𝜎𝑀 𝐻!"!𝑅!"!!!!! = 0. 
The resulting fixed fee is: 












In order to determine the equilibrium outcomes for the fixed market, we followed the 
exact same procedure as in the mobile market. First, we found the optimal pricing 
structure holding market shares constant, through appropriate adjustments of the fixed 
fees, and then, in a second step, networks’ equilibrium fixed fees were determined. 
Below we present the relevant computations and results, assuming that the necessary 
second-order conditions hold. 
For on-net prices 𝑝!!!  and the fixed-to-mobile price 𝑝!"!"  , fixed firm 𝑘 holds 𝑤!! =
𝑁 𝜃!ℎ!"!!!!! +𝑀 𝛼!!!!! ℎ!"!" − 𝐷! constant.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






For on-net prices 𝑝!!!  and the fixed-to-mobile price 𝑝!"!! fixed firm 𝑘 holds 𝑤!! constant.  
Using !"
!"
= −𝑞 and !!!!
!
!!!!





! ×𝑑𝑝!!! − 𝑑𝐷! ⟺
!!!
!!!!
! = 𝑁𝜃! 𝛽!𝑝!!! 𝑞!!! ! − 𝑞!!! , 
0 = 𝑀 !!!"
!"
!!!"
!"×𝑑𝑝!"!" − 𝑑𝐷! ⟺
!!!
!!!"
!" = −𝑞!"!"𝑀. 
For off-net prices 𝑝!"! , taking into account the call externality and the assumption of off-
net call prices, we have that: 
!!!
!!!"
! = −𝑁 1− 𝜃! 𝑞!"! + 𝜃!𝛽!𝑝!"! 𝑞!"! ! . 




! = 𝑁!𝜃!! 𝑞!!! + 𝑝!!! − 𝑐!!! 𝑞!!!
! + 𝛽!𝑝!!! 𝑞!!!




! = 𝑁!𝜃! 1 − 𝜃! 𝑞!"! + 𝑝!"! −   𝑐!"! 𝑞!"! ! − 𝑞!"!! −
!!
!!!!




!" = 𝑀𝑁𝜃! 𝑞!"!" + 𝑝!"!" − 𝑐!"!" 𝑞!"!" ! − 𝑞!"!" = 0. 










 , 𝑙 ≠ 𝑘. 
 
Regarding subcription fees, using the implicit function theorem, we determined the 
impact on market shares of changing fixed fees, which is given by: 
 !"
!"
= −𝛾 𝐼! − 𝛾𝑁𝐺!ℎ! !!𝐺! ≡ −𝛾𝐻!. 
Thus, the impact of firm 𝑘’s fixed fee, 𝐷!, on firm 𝑙’s market share, 𝜃!, is 
!!!
!!!
= −𝐻!"! . 













+ 𝐷! − 𝑓!  
+  𝑁𝜃! 1− 𝛾𝑁 𝐻!"!!𝑅!"!!!!!! = 0. 
The resulting fixed fee is:  














APPENDIX 2: Changes in Mobile Operators’ Market Shares  
 
Pure LRIC 
 𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
TMN 42.47 41.46 40.01 38.27 39.53 
Vodafone 38.58 37.80 36.71 35.50 38.14 
Optimus 18.94 20.74 23.27 26.23 22.33 
Reciprocal with fixed network 
TMN 42.29 41.24 39.79 38.09 39.30 
Vodafone 38.46 37.64 36.55 35.39 37.92 
Optimus 19.25 21.11 23.66 26.53 22.78 
Bill and Keep 
TMN 42.25 41.20 39.74 38.05 39.25 
Vodafone 38.43 37.61 36.52 35.36 37.88 
Optimus 19.33 21.20 23.74 26.59 22.87 
Asymmetric rates 
TMN 39.06 38.56 37.72 36.64 38.73 
Vodafone 34.52 34.22 33.71 33.25 37.12 







APPENDIX 3: Changes in Mobile Operators’ Profits  
 
    𝛽!=0 𝛽!=0.25 𝛽!=0.5 𝛽!=0.75 𝛽!=1 
TMN 
Pure LRIC 96 145 240 460 1340 
Reciprocal with fixed 113 166 267 494 1401 
Bill and Keep 118 172 274 503 1417 
Asymmetric rates -79 -31 57 263 1093 
Vodafone 
Pure LRIC 94 148 251 484 1380 
Reciprocal with fixed 109 168 277 517 1441 
Bill and Keep 114 174 284 526 1456 
Asymmetric rates -66 -14 81 297 1137 
Optimus 
Pure LRIC 56 99 177 341 695 
Reciprocal with fixed 65 112 197 369 740 
Bill and Keep 67 115 202 376 750 
Asymmetric rates 225 265 343 507 810 
 
 
 
